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Abstract 
Multi-server authentication, being a crucial component of remote communication, provides the ease of one-
time registration to users from a centralized registration authority. Therefore, the users could avail the 
offered services after getting authenticated of any service provider using the same registration credentials. In 
recent years, many multi-server authentication protocols have been demonstrated. Nonetheless, the existing 
schemes do not meet the security and efficiency requirements of the time. Recently, Chuang et al. presented a 
multi-server biometric authentication protocol which was later crypt-analysed and improved by Lin et al. 
with the identification of few attacks. Later, we discover that Lin et al.’s protocol is still prone to replay attack, 
privileged insider attack, trace attack, de-synchronization attack and key-compromise impersonation attacks. 
In this study, we present a multi-server authentication protocol which is not only comparable with Lin et al.’s 
scheme but also efficient than other state-of-the-art multi-server protocols. The security properties of our 
scheme are proved using formal analysis and evaluated with automated verification tool based on ProVerif 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Multi-server authentication enables cost efficient authentication that leads to the quick accessibility of remote 
online services for users in the public environment. The multi-server authentication is synonymous to 
overhead efficiency for it decreases the computational or communication delay when a subscriber seeks to 
avail multiple services from various service providers in a network. In multi-server authentication, the user 
needs a single password and registration phase to avail services from several online servers. The remote 
communications amid authentication of smart gadgets often encompass the multi-server authentication 
paradigm, which signifies towards the robustness and efficiency of these protocols. The multi-server setup 
comprises of three participating entities, i.e., user (subscriber), server (service dispenser) and Registration 
Centre (RC). The user gets the one-time registration performed through RC and thereafter, it could be 
dispensed with the offered services after having performed the mutual authentication phase with server.   
      In the previous decade many multi-server authentication techniques can be witnessed. Nevertheless, there 
is always need of more efficient and secure protocols in the wake of increasing mobile users and wireless 
gadgets. Earlier in 1981, Lamport [1] demonstrated a protocol for remote authentication using an open and 
insecure channel. Nonetheless, the requirement of password or verifiers’ maintenance in a database on the 
server is taken as a limitation for malicious tendencies of an adversary to exploit it. Following the Lamport 
work, different authentication schemes were proposed [3-5], however, these were based on single server 
architecture, which do not cater to the requirements of multi-server architecture paradigm. Now in literature, 
we can see many multi-server authentication schemes [6-11] related to smart card bearing biometric and 
anonymity properties. In this regard, Liao and Wang [6] put forwarded a dynamic-ID-based authentication 
scheme. This scheme was investigated by Hsiang and Shih [8], who revealed about the scheme’s vulnerability 
as privileged insider attack, impersonation attack, and not supporting mutual authentication. Then, some 
additional schemes were proposed by a few scholars [13-16]. To surmount the limitations of those protocols, 
biometric authentication schemes were demonstrated as a three-factor authentication [12, 17-18]. 
Nonetheless, these schemes are prone to weaknesses such as lack of efficiency and anonymity. Subsequently, 
Chuang and Chen [19] introduced an anonymous multi-server authentication scheme. Unfortunately, Lin et al, 
[22] initiated masquerading attacks, and the protocol could not protect its session key on the exposure of 
private secrets. Then, Lin et al, presented an enhanced scheme considering the above flaws. Unfortunately, 
Lin et al. protocol is prone to replay attack, privileged insider attack, trace attack, de-synchronization attack and 
key-compromise impersonation attack. The current study takes a review of Lin et al. protocol [22] along with 
demonstration of the scheme’s cryptanalysis. Ultimately, we propose an enhanced biometric multi-server 
authentication scheme that eliminates the registration centre from mutual authentication between user and 
server, leading to communicational efficiency. Besides, our scheme is complemented with formal analysis and 
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automated tool-based verification analysis that demonstrate the resilience of the contributed protocol in 
comparison with state-of-the-art protocol.  
        As per the organization of this paper, the Section 2 describes the preliminaries related to current work. 
The Section 3 illustrates the working of Lin et al.’s protocol. The Section 4 presents the contributed model of 
our scheme. The section 5 and 6 portray informal security discussion and performance evaluation, 
respectively. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings. 
 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we have described the elliptic curve and hash function, which served as cryptographic building 
blocks for designing a protocol in this study.  
 
 
 
2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
 
The Elliptic Curve Cryptography affords effective cryptographic techniques in comparison with traditional 
ones like DSA, DH and RSA. Such crypto-primitives assure less key-size as compared to key sizes in 
conventional cryptography. A non-super singular elliptic curve E, can be defined over a finite field Fp, as 
Ep(𝜌, 𝜕): y2 = x3 + 𝜌 x + 𝜕 (mod p) and 4 𝜌 3 + 27 𝜕 3  ≠ 0 (mod p), while 𝜌, 𝜕 𝜖 Fp and p serves as a large prime 
number. In this context, we define some intractable problems, providing the basis of security for the existing 
work as shown below: 
1. Referring to Elliptic Curve-based Computational Diffie–Hellman problem (EC_CDHP), it is computationally 
intractable to construct abP, given G’s generator P, aP, bP.                       (1)    
2. Referring to Elliptic Curve-based Discrete Logarithm Problem (EC_DLP), it is computationally intractable to 
derive a from a point Q=aP on an elliptic curve, where P serves as a G’s generator.           
(2) 
2.2 Hash digest function 
We assume a one-sided hash function as h:{0,1}* → Z*p that takes as random input a variable-sized string 𝜏, 
and outputs y, a string of fixed length, i.e., y=h(𝜏), which is termed as the hash value. Any deliberate or 
accidental change in 𝜏 is instantly reflected in y. A secure hash-function underpins the following features:  
1. It is intractable to alter the message 𝜉 without, the h(𝜉) being modified. 
2. It is improbable to construct the string 𝜉, which generates the hash i.e., h(𝜉), as pre-image resistance. 
3. It is computationally difficult to find an input 𝜉2, given 𝜉1, where 𝜉1 ≠ 𝜉2 and h(𝜉1)=h(𝜉2) simultaneously. 
4. Lastly, it is difficult in polynomial time to locate any two strings 𝜉1 and 𝜉2, provided the equality 
h(𝜉1)=h(𝜉2) also holds, termed as a strong collision resistance. 
 
3. WORKING AND CRYPTANALYSIS OF LIN ET Al. PROTOCOL 
The design of Lin et al.’s protocol is illustrated as under: 
3.1   Revisiting Lin et al.’s scheme 
The Lin et al.’s protocol [22] encompasses the registration phase, login and mutual authentication phase as 
exhibited in Figure 1. We used some symbols in this study as given in Table I. 
 
Table I.  Symbolic Representations  
Symbols  Meanings 
Ui, Sj, RC ith user, jth server, and Registration centre 
IDi, SIDj  Identities of Ui and Sj 
PWi, BIOi:  Ui’s password, Ui’s biometric identity 
PIDj:  The shared value between RC and Sj 
h(.):  a secure hash digest function 
H(.):  Bio-hashing function 
Ti/Tj:  Timestamps 
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x:  RC’s master key 
SKij:  Mutually agreed Session Key (Ui and Sj) 
||/ :   concatenation and XOR functions 
 
3.1.1  Server Registration procedure 
This scheme involves a trusted RC and 𝜓 number of reliable servers Sj, such that j=1…..𝜓. The Sj registers itself 
by sending SIDj to RC. The latter calculates rj=h(SIDj || x) and forwards to Sj to initialize the service providing 
server’s setup. 
3.1.2 User Registration Stage 
In this stage, Ui gets registered from the trusted RC. Afterwards, the former may receive the stipulated 
services of service providing servers (Sj). To register itself, the user Ui follows the under-mentioned steps: 
1. The user submits {IDi, h( PWi|| BIOi), h(IDi|| BIOi)} by computing h( PWi|| BIOi) and h(IDi|| BIOi)} to RC, 
using a confidential channel. 
2. RC gets and calculates Ai=h(IDi ||x), Bij= h(Ai || rj)), Dij= Eh(IDi || BIOi) [Bij], Ei= h(Ai ||h(PWi || BIOi)||IDi). 
It, then, stores the parameters in SC {Dij, Ai, Ei} and sends to Ui. 
 
3.1.3 Mutual Authentication Stage 
1. In login stage, Ui inserts its smart card (SC) to follow the login steps and get authenticated access of Sj. 
After inserting SC, Ui give the parameters IDi, PWi and BIOi as input in smart card and calculates Ei*= 
h(Ai ||h(PWi || BIOi)||IDi) and finds the validity of equation Ei* ?= Ei. On finding it as true, it further 
generates nonce m and timestampTi. Then, it computes M=m.P, decrypts Dij into Bij as, {Bij ← D h(IDi || 
BIOi) [Dij]}. Further, it computes Hi=Aih(M||Ti || SIDj) and Zi = EBij [h(PWi || BIOi,), M, Ti]. Finally it 
submits the message {Ai, Hi, Zi} to Sj for authentication. It is worth mentioning here that the timestamp 
is used in Lin et al.’s protocol for time synchronization to avoid the replay attacks. 
2. Upon receiving the parameters in authentication phase, the server computes Bij= h(Ai || rj), and {h(PWi|| BIOi,), 
M, Ti}← DBij [Zi] by decrypting Zi. Then, Sj Checks the timestamp freshness by generating Tj and verifying 
Tj-Ti< ΔT. If true, then computes Hi*=Aih(M||Ti || SIDj), and checks again Hi* ?= Hi. Now on positive 
verification, it generates a random integer n, and calculates Vi=h(SIDjh(PWi || BIOi)), N=n.P, Ki=EBij [Vi, 
N, SIDj], and SKij=n.M. Now it submits the message {Ki} to user for further verification. 
3.  
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Figure 1.  Lin et al.’s protocol Registration and Mutual Authentication phases 
4. Ui receives the message and decrypts Ki as { Vi, N, SIDj}=DBij[Ki].Now it computes Vi*=h(SIDj h(PWi || 
BIOi)) and checks Vi*= Vi. If true, then computes SKij=m.N, and Li=h(SKij || h(PWi || BIOi)). Ultimately, it 
submits the message {Li} to Sj for acknowledgement and verification. 
5. Sj gets the parameter {Li} and computes h(SKij || h(PWi || BIOi)). Then, it compares h(SKij || h(PWi || BIOi)) 
?=Li. If this inequality holds true, it treats the user as a valid user, on the other hand it terminates the 
session.  
 
3.2      Drawbacks in Lin et al. scheme. 
 
This section covers the Drawbacks of Lin et al. protocol, which is discovered as prone to replay attack, server 
spoofing attack and trace attacks. The limitations of Lin et al.’s protocol are narrated as under. 
3.2.1 Replay Attack 
The replay attack could be launched successfully by resending the message {Ki} by an adversary, and impersonating 
a legal server Sj to deceive a legitimate user Ui. Whenever, the same user Ui tries to establish a session with a 
specific Sj, the adversary may launch this attack by replaying Ki towards Ui. The parameter Ki does not contain any 
timestamp or any factor that Ui could authenticate Sj. Although an adversary cannot construct this Ki by itself, since 
it requires encryption of Vi, N, SIDj parameters using a Bij key, as Ki=EBij [Vi, N, SIDj].This attack could be 
thwarted by bringing a timestamp mechanism from Sj entity or making include in this message any parameter value 
from the current session i.e M=n.P. This timestamp or the value M, if included, might debar an adversary to replay 
this message. 
Issues Smart card {Dij, Ai, Ei} 
{IDi, h( PWi|| BIOi), h(IDi|| BIOi)} Ai=h(IDi ||x) 
Bij= h(Ai || rj)), 
Dij= Eh(IDi || BIOi)[Bij], 
Ei=h(Ai ||h(PWi || BIOi)||IDi) 
1. Ui inputs IDi, PWi and the BIOi into SC and 
calculate Ei*=h(Ai ||h(PWi || BIOi)||IDi) 
Checks Ei* ?= Ei 
It generates nonce m, timestamp Ti, 
M=m.P, Bij ← Dh(IDi || BIOi)[Dij], 
Hi=Aih(M||Ti || SIDj), 
Zi = EBij [h(PWi || BIOi,), M, Ti] 
USER REGISTRATION  
{ Ai, Hi, Zi} 
 
2.  Bij= h(Ai || rj), 
{h(PWi || BIOi,), M, Ti}← DBij [Zi]  
Checks Tj-Ti< ΔT 
Hi*=Aih(M||Ti || SIDj), 
Checks Hi* ?= Hi 
Generates a random number n, 
 Vi=h(SIDjh(PWi || BIOi)), N=n.P, 
Ki=EBij [Vi, N, SIDj] 
SKij=n.M 
Ui gets the SC and 
makes no addition in it 
Ui Sj 
Ui RC 
MUTUAL AUHTHENTICATION PROCESS: 
3.  { Vi, N, SIDj}=DBij [Ki] 
Vi*=h(SIDjh(PWi || BIOi)) 
 
Checks Vi*= Vi , 
SKij=m.N , 
Li=h(SKij || h(PWi || BIOi)) 
 
{Li} 4.    Check 
h(SKij || h(PWi || BIOi)) ?=Li 
 
{Ki} 
Ui chosses IDi, PWi, 
computes h( PWi|| 
BIOi), h(IDi|| BIOi) 
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3.2.2  Privileged insider attack 
This attack can be initiated by a privileged insider 𝔗, for instance, system administrator, or privileged insider of RC, 
who might get access to the parameters sent for registration purpose. In Lin et al. scheme, if the insider 𝔗 is able to 
approach any user’s registration parameters {IDi, h( PWi|| BIOi), h(IDi|| BIOi)}, then it may impersonate as a legal 
user Ui by putting a fake authentication request on behalf of legitimate user in the following manner. 
1. Assuming, the malicious insider 𝔗  possesses the parameter Ai by intercepting the Ui’s messages on a public 
channel, and Dij by extracting smart card contents using differential power analysis. 
2. Next, 𝔗 computes MA= m.P by generating a random integer m. 
3. Then, it further computes Hi=Aih(M||Ti || SIDj) by generating a fresh timestamp Ti. 
4. Next, it decrypts Dij, i.e. Bij ← Dh(IDi || BIOi)[Dij], and computes Zi = EBij [h(PWi || BIOi), MA, Ti]. 
5. Then, it submits the authentication message { Ai, Hi, Zi} to server, that would be duly verified by Sj, however 
fake. 
6. In this way, a successful insider attack may launched by a malicious insider. 
3.2.3 Trace Attack 
In this attack, an attacker may recognize or trace the location for any legal participant through finding the similar 
parameters in two different sessions. In Lin et al, the Ai parameter in a login request always remains the same for all 
sessions. Hence, an adversary, comfortably, analyze the traceability for a user Ui. 
3.2.4 De-synchronization Attack 
This is not an outsider attack. A user Ui might get trapped during login phase of the protocol, while interacting with 
smart card, and inputting its IDi, PWi and BIOi parameters. The smart card may refuse a valid user for non-matching 
of BIOi parameter as input by the user. This might be due to minor difference in the capturing of BIOi input through 
sensor, so the pre-stored BIOi value may be a little different from the captured BIOi input. In this case, the smart card 
may refuse to login a legitimate user.  Consequently, a user will not be able to proceed with the mutual 
authentication phase with server. 
3.2.5 Key-Compromise Impersonation Attack (KCI) 
This is an attack that can be initiated by an adversary towards entity ℵ1 through impersonating another legal 
entity ℵ2, in case some key or secret of ℵ1 is accessed by the attacker. In Lin et al. scheme, a malicious privileged 
insider, having access to h( PWi|| BIOi) and h(IDi|| BIOi) may easily initiate an attack towards Ui by impersonating 
as a server by adopting the following steps: 
1. The adversary recovers Dij from smart card employing differential power analysis and extracts Bij by 
decrypting Dij through h(IDi || BIOi) i.e.  
Bij ← Dh(IDi || BIOi)[Dij]. 
2. Next, it generates a random number na and calculates Na= na.P, Vi=h(SIDjh(PWi || BIOi)) and Ki=EBij [Vi, Na, 
SIDj]. 
3. Finally, it sends Ki to a user Ui for impersonating as a server. 
4. The Ui confirms the adversary as a legal user, simply due to encrypted forged message out of Bij.  
In this way, a successfull KCI attack could be launched against user, in Lin et al. scheme. 
4.  PROPOSED MODEL 
 
To date, the previous multi-server authentication protocols seem to go through many pitfalls as far as security and 
efficiency is concerned. We present an improved Lin et al.’s scheme that bears the optimized and comparable 
security features including biometric attributes, in relation to existing protocols. Our proposed protocol encompasses 
four stages, i.e., initialization stage, user registration stage, mutual authentication stage, and password modification 
stage as shown below: 
4.1 Initialization Phase 
The contributed scheme involves a trusted RC and 𝜓 trusted servers Sj, while j=(1….. 𝜓). The server Sj performs 
registration through RC before Ui’s registration process, over a confidential channel. The Sj sends its identity SIDj 
towards RC. Subsequently, RC will compute PIDj=h(SIDj || x) and submit towards Sj, which remains the shared 
secret between RC and Sj, while x is the master key of RC. Next, RC generates y as its private key, and computes 
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k=h(y) and distribute k to each server. RC also computes its public key Q=kP and publishes it publicly. The RC 
chooses Elliptic Curve Ep(a,b), while P being the generator of further points with large primer number order, and it 
is a hard discrete logarithm problem in the cyclic subgroup G. 
4.2 The Registration stage 
In this stage, Ui gets registered from RC on a secure channel, and then, it can access all Sj servers for mutual 
authentication phase, thereafter. Ui performs the under-mentioned steps with RC: 
1. Ui selects IDi, PWi, r1, r2, and imprints BIOi on the sensor. It computes R1=h( PWi|| H(BIOi)) , R2 =h(IDi|| 
H(BIOi)) r1 and R3=h(h(IDi)|| H(BIOi)) r2. Then it sends {IDi, R1 , R2 , R3 } to RC for registration. 
2. RC receives and computes Ai=h(IDi ||x), Bij= h(Ai || PIDj)), Dij= R2  Bij, Ei= h(Ai || R1 ||IDi) and Fi = R3  
Ai. It, then, stores the parameters in SC {Dij, Ei, Fi} and sends to Ui. 
3. Ui receives the SC, computes Dij' = Dij r1, Fi'=Fir2 , and replaces Dij with Dij' and Fi with Fi' in smart card. 
The smart card now contains {Dij', Ei, Fi'}. 
 
5.3 Mutual Authentication Stage 
 
1. In login stage, Ui employs its smart card for getting the verified access to services of Sj. For this 
objective, Ui inputs its IDi, PWi and then imprints BIOi in biometric scanner device. Next, the smart card 
calculates R1=h( PWi|| H(BIOi)), Ai = h(h(IDi)|| H(BIOi))  Fi',  and Ei*=h(Ai ||R1||IDi). Then, it checks the 
validity Ei* ?= Ei. If true, then it will generate random number m and compute M=m.P, W=mQ, 
X=AiW, Bij = h(IDi|| H(BIOi))  Dij ' and Hi= h(M|| W ||Ai ||Bij || SIDj). Ultimately, it submits {M, X, Hi} to 
Sj using a public channel.  
2. In authentication phase, the Sj receives parameters and computes W'=kM, Ai = X W', Bij= h(Ai || PIDj), Hi*= 
h(M|| W' ||Ai ||Bij || SIDj) and checks the equality for Hi* ?= Hi. If this equality matches, it generates a random 
integer n and calculates SKj=n.M, N=n.P and Vi=h(SKj || Ai || Bij ||W ||M). Now it submits the contents {N, 
Vi} to user for further verification on public channel. 
3. Ui receives the message and computes SKi=m.N and Vi*=h(SKi || Ai || Bij || W || M)). Then, it verifies the 
equation Vi* ?= Vi. If the equality matches, it further calculates Ji= h(SKi || Ai || Bij || M ||N || SIDj) and 
submits the message {Ji} to Sj for acknowledgement and verification.  
4. Sj receives the message Ji and computes Ji*= h(SKj || Ai || Bij || M ||N || SIDj). Then, it compares the 
equation Ji* ?= Ji. If this equation holds true, then treats the user as the valid user, otherwise, 
terminates the session.  
4.4  Password Updating Procedure 
Ui gets its password updated by adopting this phase, into a new password (PWinew) without consulting RC. The 
steps for the password modification are  stated below: 
1. First, the user puts its SC into the scanner and inputs the corresponding identity (IDi*), password (PWi*), and 
onwards the biometric identity (BIOi*) in scanner device. Then, SC calculates R1=h(PWi|| H(BIOi)), Ai = 
h(h(IDi)|| H(BIOi))  Fi',  and Ei*=h(Ai ||R1||IDi). Next, it checks the validity for Ei* ?= Ei. If it does not 
find a match, it aborts the modification phase. 
2. Otherwise, the smart card invokes the user to enter a new password PWinew and computes Ai = 
h(h(IDi)||H(BIOi))Fi', R1new=h(PWinew||H(BIOi)) and Einew=h(Ai || R1new ||IDi)). 
3. Next, the SC stores Einew into the SC to replace Ei. 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS  
This section covers the informal security discussion, automated security verification, and formal logic analysis [24-
31] of the proposed protocol and has been presented as under: 
 
5.1 Security discussion 
This sub-section entails the informal discussion about the security of the contributed scheme. 
5.1.1 Replay Attacks 
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These attacks could be initiated while the adversary replays the intercepted contents to betray or masquerade any 
legitimate session member [32-36]. An attacker, having the open messages {M, X, Hi, N, Vi, Ji} may attempt to 
replay those contents on both sides to forge the legitimate participants. Nonetheless, Ui validates Sj and nullifies the 
chances of any replay attack by computing and verifying the equation Vi* ?=h(SKi || Ai || Bij ||W ||M). The 
calculation of Vi comprises the parameter M, which must be concatenated with other parameters to foil the replay 
attack. Likewise, Sj may thwart the replay attack by computing and verifying the equation Ji ?= h(SKj || Ai || Bij ||M 
||N || SIDj) in the third run of the protocol. The presence of M and N parameters in the computation of Ji make 
certain that the replay attack is defeated. Therefore, the contributed protocol could thwart a replay attack.
 
 
 
Figure 2. Proposed Authentication Protocol 
5.1.2 Modification Attacks 
SC {Dij, Ei, Fi} 
Ai=h(IDi ||x), 
Bij= h(Ai || PIDj), 
Dij= R2  Bij , 
Fi = R3  Ai, 
Ei=h(Ai || R1 ||IDi)) 
1. The user inputs (IDi, PWi and biometric BIOi) into 
SC and calculate R1=h( PWi || H(BIOi)), Ai = 
h(h(IDi)|| H(BIOi))  Fi', Ei*=h(Ai ||R1||IDi) 
Checks Ei* ?= Ei 
It generates nonce m, M=m.P,  
W=mQ, X=Ai W, Bij = h(IDi|| H(BIOi))  Dij ', 
Hi= h(M|| W ||Ai ||Bij || SIDj) 
REGISTRATION STAGE: 
{ M, X, Hi} 
 
2.  S computes W'=kM,  
     Ai = X W',  
     Bij= h(Ai || PIDj), 
     Hi*= h(M|| W' ||Ai ||Bij || SIDj), 
     Checks Hi* ?= Hi 
     Generates a random number n, 
     SKj=n.M,    N=n.P 
     Vi=h(SKj || Ai || Bij ||W ||M), 
 
 
     
Ui receives the SC, computes 
Dij' = Dij r1, Fi'=Fir2 , 
Now replaces Dij with Dij', Fi 
with Fi' in SC 
Ui Sj 
Ui RC 
MUTUAL  AUHTHENTICATION STAGE: 
 
3. SKi=mN 
   Vi*=h(SKi || Ai || Bij ||W ||M), 
   Vi* ?= Vi, Then computes  
   Ji= h(SKi || Ai || Bij || M ||N || SIDj)  
{N, Vi} 
4.    Check 
Ji ?= h(SKj || Ai || Bij ||M ||N || SIDj)  
{Ji} 
Ui chooses identity IDi, password PWi, 
random numbers r1, r2 . Then, it 
imprints biometric BIOi, 
R1=h( PWi || H(BIOi)) ,  
R2 =h(IDi  || H(BIOi)) r1, 
R3=h(h(IDi) || H(BIOi)) r2, 
Secure channel 
Shared session key = SK= h(SKi || Ai || Bij || W ||M ||N || SIDj) 
{IDi, R1 , R2 , R3 } 
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The modification attacks could be initiated in case; the attacker Ӑ changes and restructures the message parameters 
in an unlawful manner to betray any legal subscriber [37-40]. 
   If any adversary tries to modify the messages {M, X, Hi, N, Vi, Ji }, the server will not be able to verify the 
equality Hi ?*= h(M|| W' ||Ai ||Bij || SIDj),with an updated M. Since, Ai and Bij cannot be produced by an adversary, 
so any modification in the sent parameters will be caught instantly on the other side. Similarly, an adversary may 
also try to forge another participant by modifying the exchanged messages {N, Vi, Ji}. If it is so, the other side will 
be in a sound position to detect any such modification on the basis of Vi* ?= h(SKi || Ai || Bij ||W ||M), and Ji ?= h(SKi || 
Ai || Bij ||M ||N || SIDj) equation checks. 
 
5.1.3 Offline-password guessing attack 
This attack could be launched when an adversary tries to get either a Ui’s password after intercepting the public 
messages {M, X, Hi, N, Vi, Ji} or stealing smart card parameters {Dij', Ei, Fi'}. In all of these parameters, only Ei has 
been constructed with a combination of password PWi, i.e. Ei=h(Ai || h(PWi|| H(BIOi)) ||IDi)). An adversary may 
not be able to guess a password from Ei until it recovers the H(BIOi) parameter. Therefore, our protocol is immune 
to offline-password guessing attack. 
 
5.1.4 Stolen Verifier Attacks 
The attacker could steal valuable data which may be stored on the end of server; since the server might be 
maintaining the user-based verifier’s database. Then, the adversary may exploit the contents to forge and 
impersonate the legitimate users, which is known as stolen verifier attack.  
The contributed protocol does not manage any verifiers’ database at the end of server or registration centre, which is 
a prerequisite for the adversary to initiate a stolen verifier attack. 
 
5.1.5 Stolen smart card attack 
In offline-dictionary attack [41-46], an adversary steals the user’s smart card and attempts to utilize the extracted 
contents in initiating brute force attack. 
Using a stolen smart card, an attacker may attempt to misuse its contents. Nonetheless, as remarked in sub-section 
4.3, an adversary cannot guess password using stolen smart card parameters {Dij', Ei, Fi'}. Hence, despite stealing 
the SC contents, that adversary may not initiate any kind of guessing or impersonation attack due to the lack of 
information about BIOi parameter and dynamic identity Ai.  
 
5.1.6 Session Key Security 
This feature ensures that the agreed session key may be only in the knowledge of the legitimate participants in the 
session, such as user and server.  
    In contributed protocol, the session key is established by computing SK= h(SKij || Ai || Bij || W ||M ||N || SIDj). For 
establishing a legal session key the attacker requires to access m and n. These are high entropy integers, and cannot 
be guessed in polynomial time. An adversary cannot derive n from N=n.P, neither m from M=m.P, which might be 
intercepted by the adversary during the communication of messages on insecure channel. Hence, the computation of 
m or n from M and N is hard bounded by ECDLP problem. 
 
5.1.7 Known-Key Security 
This security feature assures the confidentiality of private keys of the communicating session members, if the 
current session key is exposed to the attacker. 
   In contributed protocol, if the session key SK= h(SKij || Ai || Bij || W ||M ||N || SIDj) is exposed by any means, the 
attacker may not be able to guess the user’s password PWi or server master key x. Thus, an attacker will not be able 
to derive the secrets from any revealed session key. Hence, the proposed protocol corresponds to the trait of known-
key security. 
 
5.1.8 Perfect Forward Secrecy 
This feature focuses on the confidentiality of session keys, in case the high entropy private key of any participant 
(Ui) or (Sj) is stolen by the attacker [47-49]. 
  The contributed scheme fulfills the requirement of perfect forward secrecy, notwithstanding the fact, that high 
entropy secrets of participating entities are exposed to the adversary. That is, if the RC’s secret x is leaked, an 
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adversary may not be able to compute previous session keys for the lack of knowledge of other parameters i.e. SKij, 
Ai , W and Bij in a session key SK= h(SKij || Ai || Bij || W ||M ||N || SIDj). 
 
5.1.9 Mutual Authentication 
This property suggests that the communicating members must verify one another’s identities during the same 
authentication protocol.  
The Lin et al. scheme lack mutual authentication, as it may suffer replay attack that damages the feature of mutual 
authentication. However, the contributed model provides mutual authentication to both legitimate entities, Ui and Sj. 
An adversary, having intercepted the publicly available messages {M, X, Hi, N, Vi, Ji} might try to modify or replay a 
message on both sides to deceive the legitimate participants. However, Ui and Sj mutually authenticate one another, 
and nullify the chances of any modification or replay attack by computing and verifying the equation Vi* ?=h(SKi || 
Ai || Bij ||W ||M) and Ji ?= h(SKj || Ai || Bij ||M ||N || SIDj). Hence, in proposed protocol both of the entities could 
authenticate one another. 
 
5.1.10 Anonymous Authentication and immunity from Trace attack 
The anonymous authentication ensures anonymity for the subscriber during its communication with Sj for mutual 
authentication phase. Further, the trace attack refers to the identification of a user’s location by the adversary during 
the exchange of messages.  
    In contributed model, the attacker may not be able to use the real identities of the interacting members upon the 
utilization of intercepted message contents. This is because, Ui sends its dynamic identity Ai in the form of X=AiW 
after computing the parameter W. An adversary cannot recover the user’s identity IDi from either X or other stolen 
smart card values, until Ui’s biometric BIOi or server’s secret x are compromised. The biometric parameter provides 
additional protection to user-oriented credentials including identity and password. Likewise, an attacker may not be 
able to distinguish among various sessions, nor could identify location of a user. Therefore, this scheme not only 
affords sufficient anonymity to the user but also provides resistance from trace attack.  
 
5.1.11 Resists user impersonation attack 
 
As we see earlier, the proposed scheme offers mutual authentication to its members, and could resist replay attack 
and modification attacks. In the light of these proofs (see section 5.1.1, 5.1.2), we can rightly say that our scheme is 
immune to user impersonation attacks. 
 
5.1.12 Resists De-synchronization Attack 
 
The proposed scheme employed bio-hashing H(.) to resist de-synchronization attack. This is a kind of self-attack 
that might occur without any sort external adversary. Since direct capturing of biometric without undergoing bio-
hashing might suffer matching problems, so hash-function helps synchronize the captured and the stored biometric. 
 
5.1.13 Privileged insider attack 
 
A malicious insider may access the registration request information sent by the user during registration process. In 
proposed scheme, we have employed two random numbers r2 and r3 on the user’s side to avoid the possible 
privileged insider attacks. The user encrypts the sent messages by taking XOR with r2 and r3, and decrypts the 
messages, received from RC, using the same r2 and r3. This procedure deceives the malicious insider by the use of 
encryption on the part of sent messages from user. In this manner, the proposed scheme remains protected of a 
privileged insider attack. 
 
5.1.14 Session-specific temporary information threat 
 
If session-specific temporary integers are leaked, an adversary might attempt to compute session keys [50-52]. 
However, unlike Lin et al., the contributed scheme is immune to such kind of attack. The reason being, proposed 
scheme’s session key SK= h(SKi || Ai || Bij || W ||M ||N || SIDj) can only be computed, if the adversary is capable of 
accessing Ai, Bij and W parameters along with the compromise of session-specific temporary values.  Hence, our 
scheme is immune from temporary information threat. 
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5.1.15 Resists Key-Compromise Impersonation attack 
 
The contributed scheme is resistant to KCI attack, since a malicious privileged insider 𝔗 may not be able to derive a 
parameter Bij in case, the smart card contents are revealed to 𝔗. However, even if the Bij parameter is exposed to 
adversary accidentally, yet the adversary 𝔗 may not construct an up-to-date Vi message, due to the unknown Ai 
parameter. Thus, the adversary may not be able to impersonate as a server. Hence, the contributed protocol is 
immune to KCI attack. 
 
5.2 Automated Security Proof 
 
The purpose of this automated tool-based simulation is to measure the robustness of our scheme against an attacker. 
ProVerif [53] is one of the effective tools as used by the research community to gauge the scheme’s robustness 
against attacks and infringement of the privacy. ProVerif relies on universally accepted rules of 𝜋 calculus (applied) 
that could support various crypto-primitives like one-sided hash digest functions, encryption, digital signatures, 
Diffie-Helman etc. For measuring the security robustness of the contributed protocol, we have tested and analyzed 
the findings regarding the scheme’s security in ProVerif simulation tool.  
    We initiate the simulation testing, initially by specifying two communication channels: the private and public 
channels i.e. SCh and PCh respectively, among various participants. We also define few constants and variables for 
this simulation. Besides, some constructors and equations are used for Bio-hashing, one-sided hash function, 
exclusive-or function, concatenation and the elliptic curve-based scalar point multiplication as shown in figure 3. 
We also design the queries to test the security and correctness of contributed scheme. . 
 
Figure 3. Constants, Events and Queries 
 
For the simulation, we defined two events for each participating member in session, such as user and server. The 
beginning and finishing events for the user (Ui) are beginUser_Ui(bitstring) as well as endUser_Ui(bitstring). 
Likewise, the corresponding events for the server (Sj) are defined as beginServer_Sj(bitstring) as well as 
endServer_Sj(bitstring) as well. The accuracy of the contributed technique could be tested by verifying the 
corresponding relationship between either of entity’s initial or final events. The events are also shown in figure 3. 
     We build three separate processes, namely User_Ui, Server_Sj, RegistrationCentreRC, for modelling three 
participating entities as Ui, Sj and RC, respectively. First, the User_Ui process generates r1 and r2 numbers, and 
compute R1, R2 and R3. Next, it sends IDi, R1, R2, and R3 using the SCh channel to RegistrationCentreRC 
process. While, on receiving xDij, xEi and xFi from the same process, it computes and updates the values of Dij and 
Fi in smart card. During mutual authentication stage, the process User_Ui sends the parameters M, X and Hi using 
public channel PCh towards Server_Sj. Next, after receiving the xN and xVi parameters from Server_Sj process, the 
User_Ui process further computes Ski, Vi’, and compares Vi’ against Vi. If it matches, then computes Ji and sends 
Ji towards Server_Sj process for further proceedings as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. User process simulation 
 
The RegistrationCentreRC process gets xIDi, xR1, xR2 and xR3 factors from User_Ui process using SCh, and 
calculates Ai, Bij, Dij, Fi and Ei. Next it sends Dij, Ei and Fi to User_Ui process using SCh as shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. RC Simulation 
 
The Server_Sj process gets the parameters xM, xX and xHi from User_Ui process to check the user’s authenticity as 
shown in Figure 6. Thereafter, it computes W’, Ai, Bij and Hi’. Then it compares xHi and Hi’. If the equality holds 
true, then generates n and computes SKj, N and Vi. Then it sends N and Vi to User_Ui process through PCh 
channel. Similarly, Server_Sj receives xJi from User_Ui process, and computes Ji’ to compare with xJi. If the 
equality holds, it confirms and verifies the User_Ui process, otherwise aborts the session. 
 
 
Figure 6. Server process simulation 
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The three participating principals interact for an unrestrained number of parallel sessions, in this way, those 
processes act in replication as depicted in the following.  
          process  
((!User_Ui) | (!RegistrationCentreRC) | (!Server_Sj) ) 
 
We get to the following results after employing the above queries in this simulation.  
 
                    Figure 7. Simulation Result 
The results (3) and (4) as shown in Figure 7 specify that the respective processes started as well as ended 
successfully. At the same time, the result (5) warrants that the attacker query is not able to derive or compute the 
session key as constructed by the processes during the authentication procedure.  
 
5.3  BAN Logic-based Security Analysis 
 
This sub-section exhibits security analysis employing Burrows Abadi Needham (BAN) logic [54-55], which is a 
logic model analyzing the security features in terms of mutual authentication and the inability of computing session 
key. Some of the terms are employed in the explanation of BAN logic as given below.  
 
Principals denoted with (Λ), are the active participating agents in our protocol. 
Keys are used in encryption for symmetric encryption. 
Nonces are non-repeatable chunks of the message. 
Some further notations that are employed in the BAN logic analysis are stated below: 
 
Λ |≡ Ξ:  Λ believes Ξ. 
Λ | ~ Ξ: Λ once said Ξ.  
Λ ⊲ Ξ:  Λ sees Ξ.  
Λ ⇒ Ξ:  Λ has got jurisdiction on Ξ;  
♯(Ξ): Ξ is fresh. 
(Ξ)Ξ' Formulae (Ξ) is combined with (Ξ').  
(Ξ, Ξ'): Ξ or Ξ' are the components of message (Ξ, Ξ'). 
(Ξ, Ξ')ḵ: Ξ or Ξ' is encrypted by the key ḵ. 
Λ 
     ḵ     
↔    Λ':  Λ and Λ' communicate using the shared key ḵ. 
 ⟨Ξ, Ξ'⟩ḵ: Ξ or Ξ' is hashed by using key ḵ. 
 
Some of the rules, we employed in the BAN Logic, such as (message_meaning_rule) implies R1, 
(nonce_verification_rule) implies R2, (jurisdiction_rule) implies R3, (freshness_conjuncatenation_rule) implies R4, 
(belief_rule) implies R5, and session_key_rule implies R6 as depicted under: 
R1: 
𝚲|≡𝚲 
𝐾
↔ 𝚲′,   𝚲⊲⟨Ξ⟩Ξ′
𝚲|≡𝚲′ |~ Ξ
 
 
R2: 
𝚲|≡ ♯ (Ξ),   𝚲|≡𝚲′ |~  Ξ
𝚲|≡𝚲′ |≡  Ξ
 
 
R3: 
𝚲|≡𝚲′ ⇒Ξ,   𝚲|≡𝚲′ |≡  Ξ
𝚲|≡ Ξ
 
 
R4: 
𝚲|≡ ♯ (Ξ)
𝚲|≡ ♯ (Ξ,   Ξ′)
 
 
R5: 
𝚲|≡(Ξ),   𝚲|≡(Ξ′)  
𝚲|≡(Ξ,   Ξ′) 
 
 
R6:  
𝚲|≡ ♯ (Ξ),   𝚲|≡𝚲′|≡  Ξ
𝚲|≡𝚲 
K
↔ 𝚲′
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Our contributed scheme should meet the understated goals to support the security features between server S_j and 
user U_i, by employing BAN logic.  
  
Ḡ1 : S_j |≡ S_j 
       𝑆_𝐾       
↔       U_i 
Ḡ2 : S_j |≡ U_i |≡ U_i 
       𝑆_𝐾       
↔       S_j 
Ḡ3: U_i |≡ S_j 
       𝑆_𝐾       
↔       U_i 
Ḡ4: U_i |≡ S_j |≡ S_j 
       𝑆_𝐾       
↔       U_i 
First, we change the communicated messages into idealized form as shown below:  
 
M1: U_i → S_j: M, X, Hi: {mP, (Ai )mQ, ⟨mP, W, Ai, SIDj ⟩ Bij} 
M2: S_j →U_i: N, Vi: {nP, ⟨mnP, Ai, mQ, M⟩Bij }  
M3: U_i → S_j: Ji:  {⟨ mP, nP,  Ai, SIDj ⟩ mnP, Bij, } 
 
Secondly, the following assumptions are developed to prove the security of contributed work. 
 
Ҝ1 :  U_i  |≡  ♯ m 
Ҝ 2 :  S_j  |≡  ♯ n 
Ҝ 3 : U_i  |≡  S_j  
(𝐵𝑖𝑗,   𝐴𝑖,   𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗)  
↔           U_i  
Ҝ4 : S_j  |≡  S_j 
(𝐵𝑖𝑗,   𝐴𝑖,   𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗)  
↔           U_i  
Ҝ5 :  U_i  |≡  S_j  |≡  U_i  
(𝐵𝑖𝑗,   𝐴𝑖,   𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗)  
↔            S_j  
Ҝ6 :  Sj  |≡  U_i  |≡  U_i   
(𝐵𝑖𝑗,   𝐴𝑖,   𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗)  
↔           S_j  
Ҝ7 : U_i  |≡  S_j  ⇒  nP  
Ҝ8 : S_j  |≡  U_i  ⇒  mP  
 
Thirdly, the constructed idealized forms such as M1, M2 and M3 of our scheme can be evaluated using the above 
postulates and premises. 
     
By applying the given rules, notations, premises along with idealizations, we arrive at the understated derivations: 
Using M1 and M3 of those idealized forms: 
   M1: U_i → S_j: M, X, Hi: {mP, (Ai )mQ, ⟨mP, W, Ai,  
SIDj ⟩ Bij} 
 
    M3: U_i → S_j: Ji:  {⟨ mP, nP,  Ai, SIDj ⟩ mnP, Bij, } 
On applying the seeing_rule, we have 
S1: S_j ⊲ M, X, Hi: {mP, (Ai )mQ, ⟨mP, W, Ai, SIDj ⟩ Bij} 
S2: S_j ⊲ Ji:  {⟨ mP, nP,  Ai, SIDj ⟩ mnP, Bij, } 
Now using S1, S2, Ҝ3 and R1, we say 
S3: S_j  |≡  U_i ~ {mP, (Ai )mQ, ⟨mP, W, Ai, SIDj ⟩ Bij} 
S4: S_j  |≡  U_i ~ {⟨ mP, nP,  Ai, SIDj ⟩ mnP, Bij, } 
Referring S3, S4, Ҝ1, R2 and R4, we deduce 
S5: S_j  |≡  U_i |≡  {mP, (Ai )mQ, ⟨mP, W, Ai, SIDj ⟩ Bij} 
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S6: S  |≡  U_i |≡  {⟨ mP, nP,  Ai, SIDj ⟩ mnP, Bij, } 
Referring S5, S6, Ҝ4, Ҝ8 and R3, we get 
S7: S_j  |≡  {mP, (Ai )mQ, ⟨mP, W, Ai, SIDj ⟩ Bij} 
S8: S_j  |≡  {⟨ mP, nP,  Ai, SIDj ⟩ mnP, Bij, } 
Using S7, S8, Ҝ4, (SK= h(mnP || Ai || Bij || W ||mP ||nP || SIDj)) and R6, we get 
S9: S_j |≡ S_j  
       𝑆𝐾     
↔      U_i  (Ḡ1) 
Referring to S9, Ҝ6 we employe R6 as 
S10: S_j |≡ U_i |≡ U_i  
       𝑆_𝐾     
↔      S_j (Ḡ2) 
Next, again visualizing the idealized form M2: 
 
M2: S_j → U_i:  N, Vi: {nP, ⟨mnP, Ai, mQ, M⟩Bij } 
On applying the seeing_rule, we get 
S11: U_i ⊲ N, Vi: {nP, ⟨mnP, Ai, mQ, M⟩Bij } 
Referring to S11, Ҝ4 and R1, we infer 
S12: U_i |≡  S_j ~ {nP, ⟨mnP, Ai, mQ, M⟩Bij } 
Using S12, Ҝ2, R4 and R2, we infer 
S13: U_i |≡ S_j |≡ {nP, ⟨mnP, Ai, mQ, M⟩Bij } 
Referring S13, Ҝ3, Ҝ7 and R3, we get 
S14: U_i|≡ {nP, ⟨mnP, Ai, mQ, M⟩Bij } 
From S14, A3, SK= h(mnP || Ai || Bij || W ||mP ||nP || SIDj), and R6, we have 
S15: U_i |≡ S_j  
       𝑆_𝐾      
↔       U_i  (Ḡ3) 
Referring to S15, Ҝ5, we employ R6 as 
S16: U_i |≡ S_j |≡ S_j  
       𝑆_𝐾       
↔       U_i         (Ḡ4) 
 
The presented analysis of BAN logic formally verifies that the contributed scheme ensures mutual authentication 
which implies that the established session key SK is mutually shared between the legitimate members (Ui and Sj). 
 
6. COMPARISON AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In performance analysis section, we analyze the security of contributed model with other smart card-based biometric 
multi-server authentication schemes in comparison. Table II demonstrates the comparison of different schemes for 
susceptibility to threats, which signifies the contributed model as a resistant and efficient authenticated key 
agreement protocol in comparison with other schemes. The comparison in Table II bears Li & Hwang [16], Chuang 
et al. [19], Lin et al. [22], Irshad et al. [44], Kumari et al. [56], Li et al. [57], Amin et al. [58] and proposed 
technique, which depicts that the contributed scheme is more resistant to attacks than those schemes as pointed, or 
efficient in other aspects.  
     We analyzed and tabulate the computational costs after installing MIRACL library [50] in a mobile gadget  (Lenovo 
Zuk Z1 having Quad-core 2.5 Ghz processor with 3GB of Random Access Memory (RAM) and Android Operating 
System (OS) V5.1.1) , and a desktop computer (HP E8300 Core i5, 2.9 Ghz processor with 6GB of memory employing 
Ubuntu OS 16.10). The simulation was performed on mobile gadget for user, and personal computer on server’s end. The 
computational cost and running time of various comparative studies is depicted in Table III.     
 
 
 
Table II: Comparison for Multi-Server Authentication schemes 
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  [16]  [19]  [22]  [44] [56]  [57]  [58]  Ours 
Anonymity supported × × √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Resists Offline password-guessing attack √ × √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Resists Replay attack × √ × √ √ √ √ √ 
Resists privileged insider Attack × √ × √ √ √ √ √ 
Mutual Authentication × × × √ √ √ √ √ 
Resists Stolen smart card attack √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Resists user impersonation attack × × × √ √ √ √ √ 
Session key agreement √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Resists session-specific temporary 
information attack 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Resists De-synchronization attack √ √ × √ √ √ √ √ 
Resists KCI attack √ √ × √ √ √ √ √ 
Perfect forward secrecy √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Mutual authentication with offline 
RC 
√ √ √ × × × × √ 
                √ : Implies, the feature is supported. 
                       ×: Implies, the feature is not supported. 
 
Table III. Computational cost comparison 
Schemes Authentication phase (Computational cost) 
Ui Sj/ RC 
[16] 4TH≈ 0.268 6TH≈ 0.054 
[19] 7TH ≈ 0.469 8TH≈ 0.536 
[22] 4TH+ 2TSE + 2TESM ≈ 22.9 4TH+ 2TSE + 2TESM ≈ 4.12 
[44] 10TH+ 2TSE + 4TESM ≈ 45.84 11TH+ 3TSE + 8TESM ≈16.35 
[56] 7TH+ 3TESM ≈ 34.15 11TH+ 5TESM ≈ 10.22 
[57] 9TH + 3TESM ≈ 34.28 13TH+ 3TESM ≈ 6.19 
[58] 8TH+ 2TSE + 4TESM ≈ 45.71 13TH+ 3TSE + 8TESM ≈16.37 
Ours 9TH+ 1TSE + 3TESM ≈ 34.41 4TH+ 1TSE + 3TESM ≈ 6.12 
To make the comparison of computational costs in Table III, we denote one-way hash function with TH, elliptic 
scalar point multiplication TESM, symmetric key-based encryption TSE, and ignoring the lightweight XOR function 
due to negligible cost. According to the simulation experiment, the computed delays for TESM, TH and TSE for user 
and server are shown in Table IV. According to Table III, although our scheme bears extra computational cost than 
schemes [16, 19, 22, 57], it is secure against many threats notably, privileged insider attack, trace attack, offline-
password guessing threat, replay attack, stolen smart card threat, KCI attack, de-synchronization attack and user 
impersonation attack and also efficient in communication cost. Our scheme have not only less computational cost 
than schemes [44, 56-58] but also less communication cost, since these schemes employ RC during mutual 
authentication phase between user and server. Our scheme mutually authenticates user and server without involving 
RC, which minimizes the communication cost of scheme.  
Table IV. Computational cost comparison 
Time complexity for 
operations 
User 
(ms) 
Server (ms) 
TESM 11.227 2.025 
TH 0.067 0.009 
TSE 0.134 0.018 
 
The Table II and III manifests that the contributed scheme is immune to all attacks as discovered in [16, 19, 22], 
further it operates in less communication rounds as compared to [44, 56-68] which brings down the communication 
cost. Besides, the schemes [16, 19] do not provide anonymity. The schemes [16, 19, 22] do not provide mutual 
authentication and also prone to user impersonation attack. The schemes [16, 22] are not immune to replay attack 
and privileged insider attack. 
Table V. Communication cost in bits  
Schemes bits 
[16] 800 
[19] 1280  
[22] 1120 
[44] 2176 
[56] 3520 
[57] 3360 
 16 
[58] 2336 
Ours 1280 
 
 
Figure 8. Efficiency comparison of schemes 
 
To compute the round-trip based communicational cost, we assume that the operation hash digest (SHA-1) affords 
160-bits, user or server identity affords 160-bits, random integer affords 160-bits, and the elliptic curve point uses 
320-bits. Our scheme bears less communication cost than schemes [44, 56-58] which leads to better efficiency since 
the involvement of central authority for every session establishment may prove to be costly in peak hours in [44, 56-
58]. The schemes [16, 19] has less communication cost since these forego without elliptic curve operations which 
takes 320-bits in transit as communication cost. The performance efficiency analysis of various schemes clearly 
indicates in Fig. 8 that our scheme yields enhanced security features along with computational and communicational 
efficiencies on average, comparatively. Hence, in the light of above performance evaluation analysis as depicted in 
Table II and III, we can safely deduce that the contributed scheme is a more secure and efficient computationally as 
well as in communicational terms.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The multi-server authentication has been proved to be as one of the crucial requirements of the state-of-the-
art communication technology infrastructure. This paper studies and presents the review of Lin et al.’s multi-
server authentication protocol. The cryptanalysis to Lin et al. reveals the five ways, in which it might be 
vulnerable to attacks, i.e. replay attack, trace attack, de-synchronization attack, key-compromise 
impersonation threat and privileged insider threat. The proposed scheme not only serves as an enhanced and 
improved version of Lin et al. scheme, but also proves to be efficient in terms of computation and 
communication with many contemporary multi-server authentication protocols. Moreover, the security 
features of this research work are supported with BAN logic-based formal security analysis and automated 
analysis using ProVerif tool. In future, we intend to address the privacy concerns for cloud-based multi-server 
authentication models.  
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